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1. Introduction
Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods’ system, the world economy is characterized by 
financial instability. The incompatibility between accommodative domestic fiscal and monetary 
policy  and  fixed  exchange  rate  under  high  degree  of  capital  mobility  has  inspired  the 
development of what we call the first generation of currency crisis models (Krugman, 1979; 
Flood and Garber,  1984). These models focused on budgetary deficits  and the effect  of its 
continuing monetary financing.  The crises at  the beginning of 1990 affecting the European 
monetary system and some Latin American countries have given rise to the development of 
second generation of currency crisis models (Obstfeld (1986, 1994, 1996), Sachs et al. (1996)), 
which explained the crisis as the result of a conflict between a nominal exchange rate peg and 
the desire of pursuing an expansionary monetary policy, leading to the existence of multiple 
equilibria. The incapability of these previous models to explain the 1997 Asian crisis has lead to 
the emergence of the third generation of currency crisis models (Corsetti et al. (1999), Krugman 
(1999), Chang and Velasco (2001), Mendoza (2002), Aghion  et al. (2001)), mostly based on 
financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke et al. (1999)). 
Most of these models assume generally that all agents have perfect information or observe 
the same signals without error. Morris and Shin (1998) suggest that the multiplicity of equilibria 
in  some currency crisis  models  is  in  fact  “apparent” and is  due to this  kind of  unrealistic 
assumption. By using a more realistic assumption that agents privately observe fundamentals 
with small errors, they establish a very strong result that multiplicity of equilibria in a standard 
second generation model is eliminated. This result makes self-fulfilling expectations and their 
required belief coordination irrelevant. Based on their analysis, they urge governments to adopt 
transparent  policy  which  means  policy  that  makes  the  fundamentals  common  knowledge. 
However, the lack of common knowledge may not be sufficient to rule out multiple equilibria if 
all  speculators  observe  the  same  public  information  about  the  fundamentals  (Sbracia  and 
Zaghini (2001)) or the fundamentals are relatively strong (Chan and Chiu (2002)). Defining 
transparency as a reduction in the dispersion of private signal noise,  Heinemann and Illing 
(2002) find that a reduction in the dispersion of private signal noise lowers the critical state that 
triggers a crisis. They also strengthen the Morris and Shin’s uniqueness result using the solution 
concept of rationalizable equilibrium.1 Chang and Majnoni (2002) study contagion in a model in 
which financial crises can occur due to both weak fundamentals  and adverse self-fulfilling 
expectations. More transparency about fundamentals exacerbates contagion from one country to 
another when the first suffers from a fundamentals driven crisis. Vaugirard (2007) highlights 
the international spread of bank runs in a third-generation model of financial crises through an 
informational  channel and has  shown that  greater  transparency  about  the liquidation 
costs  of  banks’  assets does  not  eliminate  contagion  unless  the  crisis  in  the 
catalyst country is purely sunspots-driven.  In the presence of opacity,  the 
liberalization  of  capital  inflows  may  undermine  bank  stability  in  emerging  markets  since 
uninformed  international  investors  rationally  provide  large  amounts  of  funds  at  low  cost, 
enabling insolvent banks to accumulate bad loans (Giannetti (2007)).
However,  in  previous currency crisis  models,  it  is  assumed that  the central  bank (or 
government) is perfectly transparent about its preferences and no attention has paid to 
the  effect  of  central  bank  transparency  on  the  likelihood  of  currency 
crisis. In practice, central banks are not always transparent even though 
they  are  increasingly  more  transparent  since  the  1990s.  According  to 
Williams (2008), the financial sector may have played a leading role in demanding information 
from the  government,  more  particularly  from monetary  authorities.  As  central  banks  have 
1 For a survey of the literature about the pros and cons of information transparency on the exchange rate market, 
see Allegret and Cornand (2006).
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become more independent, so the demand for transparency2 has increased, both for reasons of 
accountability  and legitimacy,  and  the  need  to  guide  the  expectations  of  financial  market 
participants  (Crowe  and  Meade  (2008)).  Many  central  banks  have  attempted  to 
increase  monetary  policy  effectiveness  by  using  communication  and 
transparency practices to shape expectations of future policy decisions and 
hence influence interest  rates across the term structure. It is suggested that more 
policy  transparency  and communication  may lead  to  greater  predictability  of  central  bank 
actions, which, in turn, reduces the uncertainty or noises in financial markets (de Haan et al. 
(2007)).  Several  studies  have  examined  empirically  the  effects  of  central 
bank transparency on financial markets and have shown that, with greater 
transparency, these markets become more efficient and are more responsive 
to monetary policy (Muller and Zelmer (1999), Siklos (2000), Clare and Courtenay (2001), 
Rafferty  and  Tomljanovich  (2002),  Ehrmann  and  Fratzscher  (2007)).  In  this  respect,  the 
transparency of  monetary  policy  is  often  justified  by its  advantageous effects  on financial 
stability in speeches of central bankers (Issing (2001)).
In part  prompted by the 1994 peso and other emerging market crises,  the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has adopted at the end of the 1990s a code of good conduct3 to increase 
the transparency of official operations in emerging market economies. In the case of Mexico, its 
central  bank  has  increased  monetary  reporting  from  thrice  a  year  to  weekly  monetary 
disclosures following the peso crisis (Wilson and Saunders (2004)). Convinced by the benefits 
of more transparency in monetary policy making, more and more central banks of emerging 
market countries have adopted inflation targeting frameworks. This is a great change in central 
banking in emerging market countries since the currency and financial  crises of the 1990s. 
However,  these  inflation  targeting  regimes,  at  least  for  some  time,  have  coexisted  with 
(crawling) exchange rate bands (Amato and Gerlach (2002)). Some countries, such as Hungary 
and Poland, newly entered in the European Union, are in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
before their  adhesion to the Economic and monetary union (EMU), and need large foreign 
financing.  Many of these countries have also large public deficit  and are confronted in the 
recent  global  financial  crisis  to large outflows of  funds.  In  this  context,  the exchange rate 
objective of these countries may not be credible for market participants.
In this paper,  we study the implications of central bank transparency (or opacity) for the 
likelihood of currency crisis for emerging market and transition countries with different levels 
of public debt. For our purpose, we use a model akin to that of Sachs  et al. (1996) which 
establishes a direct linkage between public debt and currency crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the model where 
private sector is uncertain about the preferences of the government (including central bank). In 
the section after, we solve the model and examine then the effects of opacity on equilibrium 
solutions. We conclude in the final section. 
2. The model
Our study is based on the model of second generation developed by Sachs  et al. (1996), 
allowing for the possibility of a self-fulfilling panic that helps to understand several features of 
the  1994  Mexican  crisis  as  well  as  the  Hungarian  currency crisis  during  the  2008  global 
financial crisis. Self-fulfilling expectations became decisive in generating a panic and hence a 
speculative attack only after the government ran down gross reserves and ran up short-term 
2 For a survey of theoretical issues about central bank transparency see Geraats (2002). For a survey of empirical 
studies, see Crowe and Meade (2008).
3  It includes a  code of good practices in fiscal transparency adopted in 1998 and a code of good practices on 
transparency in monetary and financial policies adopted in 1999. 
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foreign currency debt to a certain level. In this kind of models, multiple equilibria can occur for 
some levels of reserves or debt, but not for others. We modify the model by introducing the 
uncertainty about the preference of the government including central bank and fiscal authorities. 
The small  open economy is populated by a private sector composed of many atomistic 
agents. Its government4 has a loss function formulated in terms of inflation and tax variability 
around of zero targets:
)(
2
1 22 ταpi +=L ,   (1)
where  pi  is the rate of inflation and  τ  the flow of government tax revenue. Reflecting the 
preference of the public, the policy decision-maker dislikes both inflation (hence devaluation) 
and  taxes.  The  hypothesis  of  small  open  economy  coupled  with  the  hypothesis  of  the 
purchasing power parity implies that the rate of inflation is assumed to be equal to the rate of 
devaluation. With fixed exchange rate and under the hypothesis of the absence of inflation 
abroad, we have 0=pi .
The government could be more or less transparent in its monetary policy decisions through 
the disclosure of information about its preferences, i.e. the relative weight (α ) assigned to the 
inflation  objective.  This  corresponds  to  political  transparency  in  the  terminology  given  in 
Geraats (2002). In the following, we define the complete transparency of monetary policy as a 
benchmark situation where the central bank is allowed by the government to communicate the 
exact value of α  to the public, in other words, the variance of α  is zero ( 02 =ασ ). In this case, 
the average value of α  perceived by the public denoted by αα =)(E  is equal to its realized 
value, i.e. αα = . When the variance of α  is superior to zero ( 02 >ασ ) and increases, central 
bank transparency decreases or alternatively central bank opacity increases. In the presence of 
opacity, the perceived value of α  could be different from the true one, i.e. αα ≠ .
The budget constraint of the government is given by: 
),( eib pipiθτ −+=                       ,0>θ  (2)
where epi  is the expected rate of devaluation or inflation, and i  is the world gross real rate of 
interest, which is assumed to be exogenous to the small open economy under the condition of 
perfect capital mobility.  b  is the inherited real stock of net commitments of the consolidated 
government. The term )( epipiθ −  can be interpreted as inflation tax revenue, which falls with 
expected inflation and increases with actual inflation. In effect, an increase in expected inflation 
reduces the demand for money and therefore the inflation tax base goes down and an increase in 
the  rate  of  inflation  corresponds  to  an  increase  in  inflation  tax  rate.  Alternatively,  in  the 
presence of non-indexed government debt, the term )( epipiθ −  can be interpreted as the gain to 
the  government,  associated  with  unexpected  devaluation  which  reduces  the  real  value  of 
outstanding government debt.
3. The equilibrium 
3.1. Perfect transparency 
Acting with discretion and taking as given the public’s  expectations of devaluation, the 
policymaker, sets pi  and τ  to minimize its loss function (1) subject to its budget constraint (2). 
The solution to this problem is:
4 It is equivalent to consider a partially independent central  bank which takes account of fiscal objective and 
government’s budget constraint. 
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Using equations (3) and (4), the loss for the policymaker becomes: 
2)(
2
1 ),( eed ibbL θpiλpi += .   (5)
where the superscript d stands for “devaluing”. 
If  the policy-maker has pre-committed not to devalue, so that  0=pi ,  then according to 
constraint (2), solvency dictates that:
eib θpiτ += . (6)
The corresponding loss of the government under pre-commitment to fixed exchange rate is:
2)(
2
1),( eef ibbL θpipi += ,                            (7)
where the superscript f stands for “fixing”. 
It’s straightforward to see that  ),( ),( efed bLbL pipi < . To make the fixed exchange rate a 
credible choice for the government, it is admitted that the policy-maker faces a fixed private 
cost of engineering a surprise devaluation: government that commits to a peg and then reneges 
on the promise typically face costs - loss of pride, voter disapproval, maybe even removal from 
office  -  that  need  not  be  proportional  to  the  size  of  the  devaluation  or  to  any  other 
macroeconomic variable. If expected rate of devaluation is epi , the government finds it optimal 
to devalue if  ),( ),( efed bLcbL pipi <+ ,  where  0>c  is  the cost  that  the policy-maker pays. 
Taking account of equations (5) and (7), this implies:
kib ett >θpi+ , with λ−= 1
2ck .  (8)
Hence,  a  devaluation  will  occur in  equilibrium whenever  inherited debt  or expectations of 
devaluation are sufficiently high.
Consider  now  the  behaviour  of  atomistic  private  agents  who  form  rationally  their 
expectations  of  devaluation.  Under  fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  these  agents  understand 
perfectly  the incentive  of  the government  to  devaluate  as  summarized  in  equation  (8)  and 
behave accordingly. Several outcomes can result from the interaction between the government 
and private agents. 
In the case of perfect transparency, the solutions are given by Sachs et al. (1996):
1) 0== pipi e  if  kibt λ< .  For  low  levels  of  debt  such  that  kibt λ< ,  only  one 
equilibrium with no expected devaluation is possible: attaching a positive probability 
to devaluation cannot be rational, for no devaluation will take place regardless of 
what agents expected. In this range the fixed exchange rate enjoys full credibility;
2) Two equilibria  are  possible  if  kibk t <<λ  depending on  expectations  of  market 
participants.  We  have  0=pi  if  private  agents  expect  that  0=epi .  Devaluation 
condition (8) shows that it is rational to set 0=epi  if the accumulated stock of debt is 
sufficiently low such that kibt <  and the government will fulfil this expectation. If 
the private agents expect a devaluation of the size ibe λθ
λpi −= 1 , then such expectation 
will be validated by the government;
3) 0>= pipi e  if  kibt > . In this case, the debt is too high so that a devaluation will 
inevitably take place. The fixed exchange rate regime has no credibility. 
3.2. Imperfect transparency 
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The multiple equilibrium solution is obtained under the assumption of perfect foresight of 
private agents in a model without uncertainty. It is based on an argument that the expectations 
of devaluation (positive expected rate of inflation) or no devaluation (zero expected rate of 
inflation) can be self-fulfilling. In a model without uncertainty, the rational private agents are 
assumed to always anticipate exactly what will happen in equilibrium. This assumption could 
be relaxed in  the present  model  once the uncertainty about  the government  preferences  is 
introduced.  In  this  case,  when  the  government  does  not  devaluate,  the  private  agents  can 
however anticipate a positive devaluation rate of domestic currency. 
Consider now that the government is opaque about its preference so that the value of α  is 
not known with certainty by the private agents. These agents, when forming their expectations 
of devaluation, have knowledge of the average value and variance of  α . Assuming rational 
expectations, taking mathematical expectations of equation (4) leads to:
))]((1[ eet ibE θpiλθpi +−= .     (9)
where (.)E  is the expectation operator. Using the second-order Taylor development to obtain 
an approximation of  )(λE , i.e.  2)( 32
2
2)( αθα
θ
θα
α σλλ
++
−≈≡ E , and substituting the latter into 
equation  (9), we obtain:
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where  0)( 2222 >−+ ασθθαα .  This  condition  results  from  imposing 
0)( 2
][ 32
2
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The solution of  epi  given in equation (10) shows that the private agents always expect a 
positive rate of devaluation when the government is imperfectly transparent, whatever is the 
level of public debt. Generally, epi  increases with the level of debt and interest rate. It increases 
with  the  degree  of  opacity  and  decreases  with  the  average  value  of  α  (the  degree  of 
conservativeness of the central bank) as shown by the following derivatives:
0
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Taking account of equations (8) and (10), we find that there is only one equilibrium solution 
according to the level of debt:
1) 0=pi  if   kib λ<  with 32
22
)(
'
θα
σθ αλλ
+
−=  and  2' θα
αλ
+
= .  The inequality  kib λ<  is 
obtained by considering that the devaluation condition (8) is not checked and by using 
equation (10). For low levels of debt, the private agents expect a devaluation according 
to equation (10), i.e. rationally attaching a positive probability to devaluation. However, 
the government has no incentive to devaluate. Consequently, only the equilibrium with 
no devaluation is realised. Due to opacity of the government, the fixed exchange rate 
regime does not enjoy full credibility although the government is pre-committed to not 
to devaluate and keeps effectively unchanged the fixed exchange rate. 
2) ib])()[(
)(
22222
32
ασθθααθα
θαθpi
−++
+
=  if  kib λ> .  The  last  inequality  is  obtained  by  using  the 
devaluation condition (8) and equation (10). The solution of  pi  is obtained by using 
equations (4) and (10).  In this case,  the debt  is  too high so that  a devaluation will 
inevitably take place, i.e. 0>pi . The fixed exchange rate regime has no credibility.
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 Due to opacity, the interval ( kibk t <<λ ) where there are multiple equilibria under perfect 
transparency disappears and joins the zone where the debt is considered as too high and hence a 
devaluation is unavoidable (Figure 1). 
We find also that the government devaluates less than what is expected. In the case where 
the level of debt is low and the government does not devaluate, the gap between the rate of 
devaluation and the expected rate ( epipi − ) is equal to  02222
222
)(
])[( <
−+
++−
α
α
σθθαα
θσθα ib . When the level of 
debt is high and the government devaluates, the gap is equal to 0])()[(
)(
22222
22
<
−++
+−
α
α
σθθααθα
θσθα ib . 
Furthermore, the opacity reduces the level of debt which is compatible with maintaining 
fixed  exchange  rate  regime.  Assume  that   αα =  (i.e.  the  private  agents  have  correctly 
estimated the true value of  α ) so we have  'λλ =  and hence  kk λλ < . In other words, the 
presence of uncertainty about the government preference reduces the threshold of public debt 
above  which  the  government  is  considered  as  lacking  totally  the  credibility  to  maintain 
unchanged the exchange rate. 
Perfect transparency
Full Credibility           kλ     Partial Credibility      k        No Credibility
                                         ib
                    Partial Credibility   kλ     No Credibility
  
Imperfect transparency
Figure 1. Debt levels and multiple equilibria under perfect and imperfect transparency. 
4. Conclusion
We have shown in a simple open economy model with public debt how the introduction of 
opacity in the monetary policy decision-making has eliminated the multiple equilibria solution 
given in Sachs et al. (1996). The presence of opacity implies that private agents always expect a 
devaluation, i.e. the fixed exchange rate regime is never fully credible. Consequently, only one 
equilibrium solution subsists according to the level of public debt, i.e. devaluating if the level of 
debt is too high and vice versa. Furthermore, the opacity reduces the threshold of public debt 
above  which  the  government  is  considered  as  totally  lacking  the  credibility  in  its  pre-
commitment to not to devaluate. 
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